CONCRETE HELL URBAN WARFARE FROM STALINGRAD TO IRAQ PDF

Concrete Hell has 37 ratings and 5 reviews. Maria said: DiMarco uses Stalingrad, Aachen, Hue City, Northern Ireland and Ramadi. Each chapter focuses on t. In Concrete Hell Louis DiMarco has provided a masterful study of the brutal realities of urban warfare, of what it means to seize and hold a city literally block by. An In-Depth Review of “Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq”. Sun Tzu, the great philosopher of war, was not a fan of urban.

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Besides getting the main ideas right DiMarco also deserves credit for readability.

Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare From Stalingrad to Iraq

Why I finished it: The book it self doesnt really cover much, just really plain. This explosion has wagfare resulted in a mass influx of people into cites from rural areas. Concreet Tzu, the great philosopher of war, was not a fan of urban warfare. Chad rated it liked it Apr 20, Therefore he believes that armies must equip and train with this in mind. Thus as stated above tanks should be divided into smaller groups to suppress enemy fire and to take out strong points.

Leave a Reply Cancel reply Your email address will not be published. Likewise the American forces pacifying Ramadi from lost perhaps 80 dead and caused light civilian casualties in 9 months of operations. Charlotte Wolery rated it really liked it Feb 29, As government forces were fighting not conctete to take cities but to pacify rebel groups and establish legitimacy to rule, the successful seizure of urban areas, if done so at the cost of significant civilian losses and violating the rule of law, often led to a pyrrhic victory.

Another vital asset tsalingrad urban fighting, at least regarding counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism, is a comprehensive intelligence system that understands and analyses the human component of the environment.

Warfare is generally a costly exercise, and once you run out of bullets, food, and equipment you can no longer effectively engage in it.

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As for the realities of military power in the 21st century given the inherent dominance of western militaries, and strong ones in China and Russia, and given that these nations will likely not be fighting each other, means that most wars will be small wars waged between nation states and small terrorist or insurgent groups. Israeli forces in Nablus in for example, lost a single military casualty and caused relatively few civilian casualties at 8 dead.

The most important is that given how inherently complex urban battlefields are it is necessary to adopt an all-arms approach.

An extension of this itaq is that the fighting to surround a city, or to cut it off, is often more time consuming, and costly, than the fighting inside the city itself. Then some cities are captured to facilitate further operations. Firstly, the American public and policy makers are generally hesitant to back operations that last months on end, preferring quick solutions which hopefully lead to decisive results, which of course precludes long drawn out sieges.

Then there are basic principles for the actual fighting inside of cities. This has lead to concfete micromanagement of military force by politicians, as well as to more cautious behavior by militaries themselves, to limit not only their own casualties, but civilian ones as well. It is also used by relatively inexperienced, or incompetent forces, such as warfaee Russians in Grozny in latewho lack the skill and training to take urban areas without incurring prohibitive casualties.

The opponents in these instances were guerrilla forces fighting against foreign intruders and had considerable benefits in local intelligence, motivation and unit cohesion. Likewise, while the British never lost Northern Ireland, the often heavy handed conduct of the British army against urbxn Catholics, stalinngrad well as the lack urbab political considerations to address their grievances until later in the conflict, meant that the war in Northern Ireland went staoingrad for more than 30 years until a relatively satisfactory peace settlement was reached.

Besides these various lessons the author asserts that in the future urban warfare will be more, not less, prevalent. As it was a limited operation, both in time and scope, it never addressed the route causes of terrorism against Israel. As such seizing them can disrupt governance, trade, industrial production, and other vital assets in order to wage war. In Grozny the Russians eventually won and captured the city, though not before they suffered horrific casualties, bombed the city to the ground, and lost most of the legitimacy of their cause.

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The infantry especially have to be well equipped with mortars, snipers, flamethrowers, heavy machine guns, and other weapons to suppress various enemy targets in cities. Russell rated it liked it May 03, Not all battles followed this dictum, but history an international attention are pushing urban warfare in this direction.

He gets the main ideas right, goes into considerable depth regarding strategy and policy, but does not get bogged down into the smaller details which belong to military manuals. Krban the Russian conquest of Grozny in the mids probably killed 30, civilians and woundedmore.

However the definitions are blurred between limited war and internal security operations; into the latter category I would put AlgiersNorthern Ireland, which he dates asand the Israeli response to the Intifada in No trivia or quizzes yet.

An In-Depth Review of “Concrete Hell: Urban Warfare from Stalingrad to Iraq” – Section

However, the author does mention that there are times when it is possible to take a city relatively quickly. While the author always remains detached and objective there is little doubt that such sentiments of frustration towards the home front would find considerable sympathy among soldiers who have engaged in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism.

This is based on simple demographics, the reality of military power in the 21st century, and on the record of conflict during the last decade.

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